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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 14, 2005, representatives from sixteen nations
gathered in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, for the inaugural session of
the East Asia Summit (EAS). The participants of that first meeting
were the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, Japan and South Korea, as well as Australia, New Zealand and India. As had been the case with China,
Japan and Korea, the latter three states are dialogue partners of

ASEAN and had either acceded or indicated their willingness to
accede to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in
Southeast Asia. The Summit, however, was not just exceptional due
to its composition. More important perhaps was the unique oppor-

tunity afforded its participants, through the EAS framework, to collectively shape the contemporary East Asian region in ways that
would best maintain its economic dynamism, enhance regional security and preserve peace and stability.
Opinions differ, but many regional observers concur that the
origins of this Summit go back to the 1990 proposal for an East
Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) popularized by former Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad. The rationale behind the
EAEG concept was economic, ostensibly devised in response to the
apparent post-Cold War gravitation towards the formation of regional trade blocs in Europe and North America. China had
strongly supported Malaysia's initiative for an EAEG that would
have excluded non-Asian states.' The EAEG lapsed, however, in
the wake of Japanese reticence and a strong US objection as Washington refused to be excluded from East Asian economic cooperation. Reactions from several ASEAN members, such as Indonesia,
were also lukewarm. In response, Mahathir modified it to an East

Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) in October 1991. The project was
later revived through the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan and
South Korea) summit of heads of state and government that first
met in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997 and eventually through the
creation of the EAS in December 2005. The EAS was rapidly defined as a venue where regional leaders could advocate and encourage progress on various issues ranging from energy security to
transnational threats.
Nonetheless, it was at first unclear to most what exactly the
raison d'itre for the inaugural meeting of the EAS was. Institutional
1. See Joseph Liow Chinyong, "Malaysia-China Relations in the 1990s: The Maturing of a Partnership," Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No. 4, (July/August 2000), pp. 672-691.

THE EAST ASIA SUMMIT

3

developments offered some clues, however, as to what might have
been expected of the EAS. For more than a decade, multilateral
cooperation in Asia - whether in the form of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) or most recently the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) - had been
driven by ASEAN. The Association looked set to assume the leadership of this latest institutional expression of regionalism, one
which included members outside East Asia. The ministers attending
the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Vientiane, Laos in July
2005 affirmed their commitment to "keep the EAS open, outwardlooking and inclusive with ASEAN being the driving force." Furthermore, they welcomed the participation of countries such as
China, Japan, Australia and India to the first Summit. Russia,
Mongolia and Pakistan had also asked to join the EAS, but their
applications were denied.
The purpose of this monograph is to consider the emergence
and evolution of the EAS against the backdrop of trends in East
Asian regionalism. While the EAS is proving to be a major pillar of
the emergent regional architecture, it is still confronted by several
major challenges arising out of three unresolved tensions in East
Asian regionalism: between inclusive and exclusive regionalism, between process and membership, and finally, between ASEAN centrality and major power leadership. The monograph proceeds in the
following manner. The second chapter discusses the origins and institutional evolution of the East Asia Summit against the backdrop
of the changing security architecture in East Asia, paying close attention to a series of defense arrangements as well as cooperative
security structures. Great attention is given here to the three main
institutional arrangements that preceded the establishment of the
EAS; namely, APEC, the ARF and the APT, before highlighting
trends and driving forces in post-Asian financial crisis regionalism.
The third chapter focuses specifically on the formation and institutional evolution of the EAS. It discusses in detail the ASEAN leadership, the U.S. factor in an expanded EAS, and assesses EAS
achievements and shortcomings to date. The fourth chapter broadens the discussion by reviewing ongoing debates over the nature
and model of East Asian regionalism. It focuses the EAS in
broader trends of regionalism by examining the sustainability of the
ASEAN centrality, inclusive versus exclusive regionalism as well as
process versus outcomes as the motivation behind East Asian regionalism. Finally, the conclusion speculates on what one might expect from the EAS in the years to come.
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H.

THE EVOLVING SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN
EAST ASIA

The evolving security architecture in East Asia, on the one
hand, has traditionally been discussed in terms of bilateral defense
versus multilateral cooperative arrangements. On the other hand, a
growing number of analysts believe defense and cooperative security are not inevitably dichotomous and inherently competitive approaches, but can and indeed should be complementary or as
William Tow has argued "convergent." 2 The defense versus cooperative security dichotomy has generally persisted in the post-Cold
War period even as efforts to develop congruence continue.'
Defense Arrangements

During the Cold War period, bilateral security arrangements
played a dominant role in regional security. In the wider Asia-Pacific region, the San Francisco System or "the hub and spokes
model" grew out of the East-West ideological rivalry and featured a
series of strong bilateral security agreements linking the United
States to its regional allies. The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, signed during the San Francisco Conference in
September 1951, was at the core of this model. In Southeast Asia,
Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, and to a lesser extent Brunei,
Indonesia, and Malaysia saw the United States as a security guarantor. The San Francisco System was applied to Southeast Asia
through the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951. The
United States had military bases in the Philippines and Thailand
and both states were indirectly involved in the Vietnam War. The
Thai-U.S. Joint Military exercise (EX Cobra Gold) was established
in 1982. All these bilateral ties were used to preserve U.S. interests
2. Volumes analyzing the relationship between security bilateralism and multilateralism in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific include: See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya,
eds., Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), William Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations:Seeking Convergent Security (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2001), and the two
volumes edited by Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice:Ideationaland Material Factors (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997) and Muthiah Alagappa,
ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumentaland Normative Features (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2003).
3. A good example is Adm. Dennis Blair's attempt to multilateralize defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific during his tenure as Commander in Chief of U.S. Pacific
forces (CINPAC). See, Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley, "From Wheels to Webs:
Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements," The Washington Quarterly, Vol.
24, No. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 7-17.
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in the region and the defense of its allies by deterring any possible
Soviet expansion. The Soviet Union also focused on bilateral agreements, including a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed
with Vietnam in November 1978.
Few multilateral defense arrangements existed in East Asia
during the Cold War era. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) was created in February 1955 as a result of the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or Manila Pact, of September 1954.
SEATO included Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and the United States but never
played an active military role. It was eventually abolished due to
internal tensions and the absence of common strategic interests.4
Contrary to its involvement in Europe through the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States feared that a multilateral collective defense system in the Asia-Pacific would undermine its bilateral arrangements while adding very little to its
military capabilities in the region. The Soviet Union did not form a
multilateral collective defense system either in Asia and instead focused, like the United States, on bilateral military agreements, including a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed with Hanoi
in November 1978, less than two months before Vietnam invaded
Cambodia.
Beyond these defense structures, regional attempts were made
at creating cooperative security arrangements in the 1960s. The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was formed in Bangkok in July
1961 and included Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand. ASA was
affected by the deterioration of Malayan-Philippine relations over
Sabah and its operations were interrupted in mid-1963. Consisting
of Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines, Maphilindo was a loose
confederation created through the Manila Agreements of 1963. It
was no longer viable due to the Indonesian Policy of Confrontation.
Established in 1967, ASEAN would be more successful.'
4. Michael Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia, (London:
Routledge, 1995), p. 106.
5. See Amitav Acharya, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 'Security
Community' or 'Defense Community'?," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2 (1991), pp.
159-177; Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia:
ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, (New York: Routledge, 2000); Michael
Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, (London: Routledge, 1989); Ralf
Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF
(London: Routledge Curzon, 2003); Sheldon W. Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional Security, (Stanford, CA.: Hoover Institution Press, 1982).
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Defense ties with the United States have continued in the postCold War era to be at the core of Japan's foreign policy. In response
to the post-Cold War strategic environment, Washington and Tokyo
redefined their alliance through the Joint Declaration of April 1996
and subsequent provision for new guidelines. Yet, pressures on the
alliance have also increased. However, the strength of the alliance
was underlined when then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
passed legislation enabling Japan to send a small naval contingent
in support of the US war in Afghanistan.
Bilateral security arrangements have also continued to play a
central part in Southeast Asian security as well since the early
1990s. While not a formal ally, Singapore has further developed
close military ties with the United States. The Philippine Senate denied a new base treaty with the United States in September 1991
leading to a complete withdrawal from Subic Bay Naval Base and
Clark Air Base by November 1992. Yet the two countries have remained military allies through the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.
Moreover, Manila signed a Visiting Forces Agreement with the
United States in February 1998. Post-9/11, the bilateral alliance was
further reinvigorated in the context of the global war on terror and
Washington gave the Philippines a major non-NATO ally status. Indonesia signed a security agreement with Australia in December
1995; later revoked by Jakarta in 1999 over the East Timor crisis. A
new security pact, the Lombok Treaty, was eventually signed between Canberra and Jakarta in 2006 and came into force in February 2008.
Multilateral Cooperative Institutions
Multilateral cooperative institutions have significantly expanded and somewhat deepened since the end of the Cold War,
with the Association enlarging its membership from six to ten between 1995 and 1999. In 2003 the ASEAN heads of state and government endorsed the Bali Concord II, adopting a framework for
the establishment of a Security Community, an Economic Community and a Socio-Cultural Community in Southeast Asia by 2020.
The creation of new multilateral instruments has been spectacular
since 1989, including APEC, the ARF, the Asia-Europe Meeting
(ASEM), APT and eventually the EAS.
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

The initiative to bring together the economies of the region in
a manner through which closer trade relations could be fostered
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was first conceived and proposed by then Australian Prime Minister
Bob Hawke in 1989, during a climate in which there was growing
interdependence among Asia Pacific economies. The common consensus at the time among ASEAN members. and its greater East
Asian and Pacific neighbors was the need to maintain an open multilateral economic trading system. Termed "open regionalism," 6 the
proposal for such a regional community came as a response to the
intensification of inward-looking forms of regionalism around the
world, especially with the institutional developments in Europe
during the 1980s and the formation of the North American Free
Trade Area (NAFTA). This gradual emergence of trading blocs
threatened to reconfigure the global trading system and resultant
trading patterns to the detriment of free and open trading practice.
Thus, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was formed.
The agenda of APEC was in essence, to fight against any exclusivist or "closed" trading behavior. Member economies agreed
that economic growth needed to be sustained through open trade,
freedom of market forces, as well as trade and investment liberalization, facilitation and cooperation. Underlying this was a hope that
in creating an institution like APEC, the sense of trust and comfort
that followed could serve as a bridge to bring together the different
levels of development and the diversity among the member economies. To that end, APEC's initial objectives were to advance the
process of regional economic cooperation as well as to push for a
positive conclusion to the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations.
Despite the common concerns, the process of formation was
delayed due to disagreements among ASEAN members, Japan and
the United States. The majority of Asian participants preferred
APEC to remain a dialogue on trade and investment rather than an
institutionalized body. In contrast, Washington and Tokyo would
have preferred to see the emergence of a negotiating group. The
breakthrough came in Seattle in 1993 when the Clinton administration displayed an unusual support for the conference and even suggested upgrading the meeting from one involving senior officials to
the level of economic ministers. America's support and emphasis on
the importance of the Asian region to American interests resulted
in a series of events that led to the Bogor Declaration in 1994 to
6. On open economic regionalism, see Ross Garnaut, Open Regionalism and Trade
Liberalization:An Asia-Pacific Contributionto the World Trade System (Singapore and
Sydney: ISEAS / Allen and Unwin, 1996).
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achieve free and open trade by 2010 for developed members and
2020 for developing member economies. By 1995, the roadmap for
APEC was ironed out in the Osaka Action Agenda, which provided
more detailed principles and directions on technical areas for cooperation known as Individual Action Plans (IAPs) and Collective
Action Plans (CAPs) - a blueprint for achieving the Bogor targets.
Since its establishment in 1989, APEC has grown to become a
major institution in the region, bringing together twenty-one economies. It is commonly considered the second largest economic
grouping in the world, with a large geographical footprint that
stretches from East Asia to South America. The success of forming
its action plans in Osaka a mere two years after declaring its goals
in Bogor, Indonesia is arguably an indication of the commitment
and strong sense of shared concerns, among the diverse member
economies. With this broad support base, APEC made remarkable
progress from its ministerial-level gathering among twelve countries
to an institution that has a permanent secretariat, and attracts
twenty-one economic leaders to its annual summits. In addition, the
APEC institutional structure is highly developed, comprising an
elaborate multilevel process that allows heads of state, leaders of
the various ministries, senior officials to work together in a whole
variety of meetings. APEC's method of creating consultative conditions to facilitate discussions is also significant in how it departed
from the hard negotiations and tough bargaining that takes place in
other major trade forums such as GATT and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The APEC summits are not without fanfare. Indeed, the often-publicized light-hearted duets during merrymaking
sessions, and the trademark photo opportunity in the host nation's
cultural garment are the hallmarks of APEC define the informal
nature of APEC discussions. Fanfare aside, when it was formed
APEC served a critical function as a vehicle through which American commitment and engagement in the region could find substantive expression.
Procedurally, the extent of representation in APEC has proffered opportunities for leaders to meet on the sidelines or in private
to bilaterally discuss issues beyond APEC. Indeed, it was under
such conditions that the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Singapore and the US was negotiated in Brunei. Increasingly, in a reflection of both the changing institutional needs in the region as
well as the fluid nature of the current security architecture, APEC
is convening to discuss issues beyond the traditional agenda of trade
and economic integration. For instance, APEC discussed the East
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Timor crisis of 1999. APEC also took a concerted stand in response
to the threat of terrorism when leaders met in Shanghai in October
2001. Notwithstanding the achievements, the credibility of APEC
has been undermined by its inability to respond effectively to crises,
in particular, the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s.
Today APEC operates in a completely new global climate with
different socio-political and economic conditions and the expectations remain high. The emergence of institutions such as the APT
and the EAS, each with their own multilateral economic and trade
agendas, have invariably diluted the role of APEC. APT's Chiang
Mai Initiative for financial cooperation and the idea of an Asian
Monetary Fund as well as the Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA) are examples of the need for a more
coherent relationship between relevant institutions and cognate
agendas.
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

Following the end of the Cold War, the security discourse in
the region quickly turned on the matter of the formation of a regional security forum which could involve key regional stakeholders
and would be able to initiate dialogue on pressing security issues
that posed a challenge to regional stability and order. Initial overtures towards these ends were articulated by Australia and Canada.
The response from ASEAN to these overtures noticeably lacked
enthusiasm. While cognizant of the need for such a dialogue and
the potential contribution of such a forum should one exist,
ASEAN's primary concerns were first, its relevance to the emerging security architecture, and second, the need for such initiatives to
be carefully calibrated so as to create the necessary conditions for
the participation of the two key players - the United States, which
at the time was flirting with the idea of scaling back on its security
presence in the region, and China, who was fast emerging as a
power of potentially significant consequence in regional affairs, but
whose intentions were not yet clear to the rest of the region.
ASEAN's reticence had everything to do with concerns that
the institution had to remain pivotal in any regional arrangements,
for fear of being overshadowed or sidelined in the broad, complex
security dynamic of the region. Against this backdrop, ASEAN
leveraged on the consensus that was gradually taking shape towards
a need for a new security architecture by floating the idea for the
formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum, which would be the first
(and to date, remains the only) regional security forum that enjoys
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representation from all the key regional players. Since its inaugural
meeting in Bangkok on July 25, 1994, the multilateral security forum has been meeting annually along with the ASEAN Summit.
The dominant argument among scholars holds that the aim of
the ARF was to maintain American military, if not political, engagement in the post-Cold War Asian region while maintaining cooperative relationships with external powers, not least of which was
China.' For many of the Southeast Asian states, the prevailing fear
was that a power vacuum would emerge in the absence of an American presence, thereby laying the conditions for competition and rivalry among the major Asian powers. This situation was created by
fears of a possible remilitarization of Japan on the one hand, and on
the other, concerns that China would take advantage of the transformed security architecture to aggressively extend its influence. A
delicate balance of power was necessary to maintain the tenuous
post-Cold War peace, and a multilateral arena was considered the
best means to attain the commitment and engagement of the relevant powers.
The official agenda of the ARF as outlined in the First ARF
Chairman's Statement (1994) was to foster constructive dialogue
and consultation among all participants on political and security issues of common interest and concern. Following the inaugural
meeting in Bangkok, a Concept Paper surfaced in 1995 that
mapped out the ARF's agenda in terms of its progress through a
three-stage process towards the provision of security and stability in
Asia - the first stage via confidence-building measures (CBMs), the
second through the development of conflict resolution mechanisms,
and the third through an elaborate approach to conflicts. Keeping
with the ASEAN principles of consultation and consensus decisionmaking, the Concept Paper firmly emphasized that the ARF process would only move at a "pace comfortable to all participants." 8
The efficacies and contributions of the ARF have been an issue
of debate among both scholars and policymakers alike. Ongoing
tensions over the South China Sea dispute have highlighted the
7. See Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's Model
of Regional Security, Adelphi Paper, No. 302 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996); Ralf Emmers, "The Influence of the
Balance of Power Factor within the ASEAN Regional Forum," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 23, No. 2 (August 2001), pp. 275-291.
8. "ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper," adopted at the Second ASEAN
Regional Forum, Bandar Seri Begawan, 1995. Available at http://www.aseansec.org/
3635.htm
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ARF's limitations.' Its failure to evolve beyond the first pillar of
confidence building measures to preventive diplomacy has been a
major criticism. That said, one cannot deny that since its formation
in 1993, the ARF has served its primary aim to stabilize the Asian
post-Cold War security environment and securely engage and involve all relevant major powers in a cooperative manner. At the
earlier stages, the Chinese government came to see the value of the
ARF to counter any dominance by the United States in the postCold War Asia-Pacific. This perhaps is what the ARF does best, by
instituting consultative security dialogue among members as a norm
- an argument favored by the constructivist school of international
relations.'o Today, the painstaking diplomatic maneuvering by
ASEAN to provide a vehicle for all major powers to express their
interests and concerns in the region is a reflection of the ARF's
continued relevance and invaluable contribution to the region's stability. Indeed, while the furor over the icy confrontation between
the United States and China at the recent ARF meeting over the
South China Sea and the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan demonstrated the reality of big power relations, it nevertheless illustrates the value of the ARF as a critical arena to address
security issues in the Asian region.
Moreover, credit has to be given to the ARF for establishing a
supplementary security structure to the existing bilateral alliances
in the post-Cold war era. The ARF as a dialogue mechanism is a
useful vehicle to establish and promote multi-polarity in the region.
This is best demonstrated by the inclusion of the interests of big
powers.
ASEAN Plus Three (APT)
The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) was born out of the regional
financial crisis of the late 1990s, and was a product of the region's
9. See Ralf Emmers, Geopolitics and Maritime TerritorialDisputes in East Asia
(London: Routledge, 2010).
10. See Amitav Acharya, "Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building: From the
'ASEAN Way' to the 'Asia-Pacific Way'," The Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1997), pp.
319-346; Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," International Organization, Vol.
58 (2004), p. 239-275; Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in
Asian Regionalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); Alice D. Ba,
(Re)negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); Hiro Katsumata, ASEAN's Cooperative Security Enterprise: Norms and Interests in the ASEAN
Regional Forum (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009).
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pressing economic needs and challenges. The Asian financial crisis
was a shock that engulfed many of the East Asian economies. It
started in July 1997 with the collapse of the Thai Baht and triggered
a financial and currency meltdown across the entire East Asian re-

gion. The countries hit hardest were Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. The affected countries had to rely <on
international help, especially from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The Asian financial crisis demonstrated the inter-connectivity of regional and global financial markets and reaffirmed the region's economic insecurity. While this

insecurity somewhat reshaped institutional structures and influenced their priorities, it also provided opportunities for negotiating
new arrangements.
The shock was aggravated by the failure of regional institutions, especially ASEAN and APEC, to respond to the Asian financial crisis. ASEAN was powerless against the economic turmoil and
the affected members had to depend on bilateral initiatives to overcome their economic difficulties. The effects of the crisis were aggravated by the fact that ASEAN was confronted with other
difficulties, including the Haze Crisis of 1997 and problems of expanding to include Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. APEC's response was also insufficient, leading to a loss of confidence in the

arrangement as successive APEC summits failed to effectively
adopt and implement measures to address the crisis. Finally, regional initiatives were rejected by Western powers. The Japanese
Ministry of Finance had proposed in the early stages of the crisis
the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). The latter
was blocked by the United States, the European Union (EU) and
the IMF at a meeting in September 1997. In short, the Asian financial crisis underscored the need for a new overlapping arrangement
capable of better defending the East Asian countries against future
shocks.
The APT idea had its genesis in the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) put forward in 1990 by then Malaysian Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohammad. According to Mahathir's plan, a caucus
would be created that could provide a collective voice for East Asia
at international trade negotiations and serve as a political counterweight to external players who attempted to influence developments in the region. Despite the fierce objections to Dr. Mahathir's
plans by the U.S. and Australian governments, ASEAN leaders saw
its value and continued to work on its realization, proposing to incorporate it into the APEC framework in 1993 and conducted in-
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formal meetings to strategize its incorporation over the next few
years.
The formal induction of the APT came about after the Asian
Financial Crisis of 1997/98 (AFC). On December 15, 1997 in Kuala
Lumpur, leaders from ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea
came together to deal with the financial crisis and to strategize support and recovery for the region. The speed with which the crisis
spread from Southeast to Northeast Asia, demonstrated how interdependent the region's economies were. Further, there was palpable disappointment at the ineffectiveness of the global economic
institutional framework in response to the crisis." It became imperative for Asian nations to have their own economic institution that
would not only safeguard but have the interests of the Asian region
at its heart. Hence in 1998, a joint statement was issued to clearly
indicate the shared interests among all thirteen nation-states to
press forward with an East Asian cooperative framework known as
"10+3."1 The resultant APT has in essence been a stoic measure to

provide an East Asian solution to East Asian problems.
Since its inception in 1997, the APT has made significant contributions to regional financial cooperation. For instance the Chiang
Mai Initiative (CMI) launched in May 2000, was a regional framework that was agreed upon after the Asian Financial Crisis to establish bilateral swap arrangements among members of the region,
preventing currency speculations and providing the foundation for
further monetary and financial cooperation in the region.
The APT has also been essential in the broadening of free
trade agreements (FTAs). Proceeding in a systematic, extensive
multi-layered approach, each East Asian economic powerhouse has
signed or is working on FTAs with ASEAN and with individual
members. For example, the first APT FTA was the Chinese proposal to create a China-ASEAN free trade area. It was endorsed and
signed by both parties in November 2001 and agreed to a year later.
In May 2002, Japan followed suit by expressing interest in creating
an East Asian free-business zone, roping in Australia and New Zealand. The enthusiasm among members has definitely contributed to
deepening cooperation and a greater sense of regionalism as evidenced by the steady progress beyond economic cooperation to issues of security more traditionally associated with the ARF.
11. Then Thai Deputy Prime Minister, Supachai Panitchpakdi quoted in Indonesian
Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4 (2000), p. 439.
12. Zhang Yunling, "Emerging New East Asian Regionalism," Asia-Pacific Review,
Vol. 12, No. 1 (2005), p. 57.
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Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD)

The Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) is the initiative of
former Thai premier, Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin felt that Asia
should have its own forum to discuss Asia-wide political and economic cooperation (or, as its founder put it, issues pertinent to the
"new Asian realism""3 ). Involving all APT countries and Mongolia,
South Asian countries (except Nepal and Maldives) and Iran, Gulf
countries (Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Saudi
Arabia) as well as Russia and the Central Asian countries (except
Turkmenistan), the ACD has been described as an initiative to promote Asian cooperation at a continental level, helping to integrate
the separate regional organizations of political or economical cooperation. Some have even regarded it as a precursor to an "Asian
Union." In terms of its geographic coverage, the ACD is the most
extensive institution. The need for this "missing link" was formally
put forward during the thirty-fourth ASEAN Foreign Ministers'
Meeting in Hanoi in 2001 and received broad support from
ASEAN members. The first ACD Ministerial Meeting was held in
2002. The ACD has developed in two dimensions: dialogue and
projects. On the dialogue dimension, the ACD Ministers' Meeting
is held annually, and on the project dimension, there are now
twenty projects. The ACD has a weak - and, by some accounts,
ineffective - institutional mechanism. It does not have a secretariat,

but Thailand acts as the coordinator of a rotating coordination
mechanism (Coordination Committee), which was created to ensure the implementation and follow up of ACD decisions. To support the development of ACD, Thailand has facilitated the creation
of an ACD Think Tank Network. However, it has not taken off
beyond the international symposium making its establishment.
"Minilateral" Initiatives

East Asian multilateral regionalism does not only comprise of
initiatives of the participants like the ones discussed above. The academic debate on multilateralism distinguishes between multilateralism with big and small numbers of participants.1 4 Advocates of
13. "Asia Cooperation Dialogue - the New Asian Realism," Keynote Address by
His Excellency Thaksin Shinawatra, Prime Minister of Thailand at the East Asia Economic Summit 2002, Kuala Lumpur, October 6, 2002. Available at http://
www.aseansec.org/13965.htm
14. Miles Kahler, "Multilateralism With Small and Large Numbers," International
Organization, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1992), pp. 681-708.
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the latter proposition argue that smaller multilateral groupings - or
minilateral clubs - tend to be more effective than big groupings at

producing basic agreements and striking and keeping deals made
among their members." A recent example is the claim by Mois6s
Nafm, former editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy magazine, that global
forums and large multilateral gatherings are undergoing a crisis."
According to Naim, the Group of Twenty - formed in 1999 following the Asian financial crisis in 1997 - offers a compelling case:
since G20 member economies control among themselves nearly
eighty-five percent of the world's total trade, any significant global
trade treaty should therefore be negotiated first among them rather
than the worldwide majority of countries, most of whose economic
activities have little impact on international trade. At the East
Asian level, a number of minilateral initiatives have emerged, two
of which - the Trilateral Summit and the Trilateral Security Dialogue - are discussed below.
Northeast Asian TrilateralSummit

December 2008 saw the formal launch of a Trilateral Summit
(China, Japan and the Republic of Korea) that could be the beginning of the establishment of a major regional institution in Northeast Asia. The three countries have been meeting at the leaders'
level since 1999 but on the sidelines of the APT process. As a potential candidate for future institutionalism, the Trilateral Summit
has yet to see the emergence of constituents in the three countries
that form regional movements or coalitions as have been the case in
the Asia Pacific region. Thus far, major think tanks in the three
countries have begun collaboration to explore modalities for economic cooperation, including the desirability and feasibility of a
free trade area. According to Kikuchi, if successful, the Trilateral
Summit could potentially supplant the APT or EAS as the more
important institution both regionally and globally." Trilateral cooperation will be a de facto driving force to promote East Asian coop15. Thomas Wright, "Toward Effective Multilateralism: Why Bigger May Not Be
Better," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2009), pp. 163-180.
16. Mois6s Nafm, "Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get Real International
Action," Foreign Policy, No. 137 (July/August 2009), pp. 136-137.
17. However, Kikuchi has been cautious in describing the newly established Trilateral Summit as an institution that is still in search of a regional identity and of becoming
a supra-structure institution underlined by a shared idea of Northeast Asia. See,
Tsutomu Kikuch, "The Late Comers are Catching Up: Institution-Building in Northeast
Asia" (2009), unpublished paper.

16

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

eration in the decades to come, although there are a variety of
obstacles the three countries must overcome. Key to this is the major roles played by China, Japan, and South Korea as majority financiers of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM)
foreign reserves pool. The transformation of the bilateral swap arrangements under the CMI into a single contractual arrangement,
CMIM, has led to the creation of an "offshoot" institution that has
important implications for East Asian regionalism.
TrilateralSecurity Dialogue (TSD)

The Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) process has its origins
in a proposal put forward by then Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, with the support of his counterparts from the
United States, Colin Powell, and Japan, Makiko Tanaka, in July
2001. The motivations behind the TSD idea had to do with the perceived ineffectiveness of larger multilateral processes such as
APEC and the ARF, and growing concerns by the three nations
over both North Korea's nuclear capability and a rising and militarizing China's intentions with respect to Taiwan. Other security-related concerns, such as global terrorism, provided reasons for the
three democracies to cooperate with each other. But equally significant was the perceived need to bring together the northern and
southern "anchors" of the U.S. strategic presence in the Pacific Washington's security alliances with Tokyo and Canberra, respectively - in the hope that this would lead to better coordination, information-sharing, and formulating a common security approach
among the three that was not possible under the system of security
bilateralism." The TSD is viewed warily by Beijing as a "little
NATO" against China.19 Chinese annoyance with such perceived
encirclement peaked in September 2007 when the navies of TSD
member countries - including India and Singapore - conducted exercises in the Bay of Bengal, close to China's sea lanes to the Middle East.2 0 Moreover, Chinese suspicions were further fuelled by
talk of a "quadrilateral dialogue" - comprising of Australia, Japan,
18. William Tow, Michael Auslin, Rory Medcalf, Akihiko Tanaka, Zhu Feng and
Sheldon Simon, Assessing the TrilateralSecurity Dialogue, NBR Special Report No. 16
(Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, December 2008).
19. Purnendra Jain, "A 'little NATO' against China," Asia Times Online, March 18,
2006. Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HC18Ad01.html
20. Rory Metcalf, "Chinese Ghost Story," The Diplomat, February-March 2008, pp.
16-18.
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India, and the United States - in 2007, which nonetheless faded
within the year.
Norms and Principles

The norms and principles adopted by the ARF, APT and more
recently by the EAS have primarily emanated from the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation (TAC). Signed by the ASEAN leaders at
their first summit in Bali in 1976, the TAC seeks to establish a
norm-based code of conduct for regional inter-state relations. It refers to the principles of the UN Charter and the principles endorsed
at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in April
1955.21 Among others, the TAC enunciates the following principles:
"Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations"; "the right of
every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion"; "Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another"; "Settlement of differences or disputes by
peaceful means"; and "Renunciation of the threat or use of
force."2 2 Based on the UN Charter, most of these principles are
well known in the study of International Relations as they represent
the underlying foundations of the traditional European system constructed on the sovereignty of nation-states. Nonetheless, the adherence to a common set of norms and principles should be viewed
as vital to the operation of a code of conduct for conflict
management.
The TAC includes provisions for a dispute resolution mechanism, a High Council for establishing techniques of mediation and
consultation. Yet, it stipulates that the the use of a High Council's
techniques "shall not apply to a dispute unless all the parties to the
dispute agree to their application to that dispute."2 3 Consequently,
the provision for a High Council, which is at odds with ASEAN's
basic norm of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other
states, has never been invoked by the ASEAN members. Instead,
the latter have continued to rely on the TAC as an informal code of
conduct.
21. See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, eds., Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the
1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order (Singapore: National University
of Singapore Press, 2008).
22. Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South-East Asia, Bali, Indonesia, February 24, 1976.
23. Ibid.
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Since 1976, the TAC has become the cardinal ASEAN document. It has provided ASEAN with a political identity, a shared
approach to security and a code of conduct for regulating intramural relations and managing existing or potential disputes. Codified
within the TAC, the code of conduct for conflict management has
relied on a modest set of international norms and principles that
has characterized the lowest common denominator among the regional partners. Respect for national sovereignty, in contrast to the
notion of political integration, has been set forward as the core
ASEAN principle. Through the TAC, ASEAN has continued to
rely on dialogue and to operate through a mode of conflict avoidance and management. The TAC has emphasized the need for a
peaceful and non-confrontational approach to cooperation and
made clear that ASEAN would deal with security matters through
political and economic means rather than by conventional military
methods. The TAC has also strengthened a sense of regionalism
amongst the members that further defined ASEAN as a regional
entity.
The TAC has in recent years been signed by non-ASEAN
members keen to deepen their relations with the Association. Significantly, China became the first non-ASEAN nation to sign the
TAC in 2003, thereby seeking to indicate its accommodative foreign
policy toward the Southeast Asian states. The Treaty has in the
meantime been ratified by all the participants of the East Asia
Summit (ASEAN plus China, South Korea, Japan, Australia, India,
and New Zealand) as well as by France and most recently the
United States. The European Union has also indicated its willingness to adhere to the Treaty. The attributes of the TAC have therefore been accepted beyond Southeast Asia, at least rhetorically. In
that sense, the TAC has helped the ASEAN countries in partly
redefining their relations with external powers.
Trends in Post-Asian Financial Crisis Regionalism

Some interesting trends have characterized East Asian regionalism since the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98. First, the region has
since accommodated a greater variety of security structures, ranging from bilateral to multilateral arrangements.2 4 The nature of
such arrangements has varied from military alliances to institutional
24. On how bilateral and multilateral modalities interact in Asia-Pacific security,
see Alagappa, Asian Security Order, and Tan and Acharya, Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order.
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expressions of cooperative and comprehensive security. 25 Second,
East Asia has seen the emergence of numerous new multilateral
institutions, such as the APT and the EAS, as well as groupings
operating at the Track one-and-a-half level such as the Shangri-La
Dialogue. The Asia-Pacific terrain has therefore evolved from being "dangerously under-institutionalized" 26 to a relatively crowded
landscape of overlapping multilateral arrangements.2 7 Third, there
has been a growing recognition of the close relationship between
economics and security, particularly since the Asian Financial Crisis. 28 The APT has sought, for example, to incorporate economicsecurity linkages as part of its cooperative structures. Likewise,
ASEAN has perceived the construction of security and economic
communities in Southeast Asia as complementary and mutually
reinforcing. Finally, existing institutions in East Asia have taken on
"new" security roles since 9/11 and the 2002 Bali bombings.
ASEAN, the ARF and even APEC, originally formed to encourage
trade and investment liberalization, had been accorded a role in the
campaign against terrorism. Health concerns, transnational crimes
and other issues have also increasingly been discussed at the multilateral level among policy and epistemic communities in the region.
Nevertheless, despite these developments and the presence of
a growing number of overlapping structures, regionalism in East
Asia has continued to suffer from weak structural capacities that
limit its ability to respond to security challenges.2 9 The ARF has
enjoyed some success in confidence-building but it has remained
questionable whether it will ever succeed in moving toward preventive diplomacy. The ARF has also remained ill-equipped to address
a series of security issues in the Asia-Pacific and is incapable of
influencing the Taiwanese, North Korean and Kashmiri issues in
spite of the fact that these flashpoints could seriously destabilize the
25. Emmers, Balance of Power and Cooperative Security in ASEAN and the ARF;
also see Tow, Asia Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security.
26. As famously argued by Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for
Peace in a Multipolar Asia," InternationalSecurity, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp.
5-33.
27. See Seng Tan, "Introduction," in See Seng Tan, ed., Regionalism in Asia Vol. III:
Regional Order and Architecture in Asia (Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, 2009), pp.
1-12.
28. Mike M. Mochizuki, "The East Asian economic crisis: security implications,"
Brookings Review, Vol.16 (June 1998); Richard Carney, ed., Lessons from the Asian
FinancialCrisis (Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, 2008).
29. Allan Gyngell, "Design Faults: The Asia Pacific's Regional Architecture," Policy Brief (Sydney, NSW: Lowy Institute for International Policy, July 2007).
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region. As mentioned above, the Asian financial crisis also highlighted the weaknesses of APEC. The crisis had by the late 1990s
underscored the need for new overlapping arrangements capable of
better defending the region against future financial instability. This
shift in perception has led to the institutionalization of the APT
grouping. This has constituted an ASEAN attempt at widening the
scope of cooperation in East Asia by linking the 10 Southeast Asian
countries to the large Northeast Asian economies. It has broken the
institutional status quo by bringing the two East Asian sub-regions
under the auspices of an embryonic unified economic and financial
architecture. In particular, the expectation has been that the APT
would tackle the economic sources of insecurity in the wider East
Asian region through financial and other forms of cooperation.
That said, the APT itself has so far failed to develop the necessary
capabilities to address regional security challenges comprehensively
as the complex relations between China and Japan have continued
to undermine its effectiveness.
Since the end of the financial crisis, the driving forces for
change in East Asian regionalism have arguably continued to be the
level of U.S. participation, the nature of China's involvement, and
the strength of regionalism in Southeast Asia. The United States
can still be expected to remain the preponderant Asia-Pacific
power for years to come although its exercise of power and influence in the region has been affected by the rise of China. As has
been noted so far, the United States has generally been supportive
of multilateral initiatives in the Asia-Pacific since the end of the
Cold War era.
China has over the last decade or so added a discernable activism to its growing economic and military growth. The Chinese
"charm offensive" toward Southeast Asia, including the negotiation
of a free trade area with ASEAN and its immediate support for the
EAS, has been in sharp contrast to China's previous suspicion of
multilateralism.o Beijing's activism with regard to the ASEAN-led
institutions has been effective in not only changing the Southeast
Asian perception of China but also in bringing new life to regional
multilateral initiatives. 3 1 The engagement between China and
ASEAN has been particularly impressive. China and the ASEAN
members signed in 2002 the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
30. Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming
the World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007).
31. Wu Guoguang, ed., China Turns to Multilateralism:Foreign Policy and Regional
Security (Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, 2007).
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in the South China Sea. The signing of the declaration indicated a
desire by the different parties involved to pursue their claims by
peaceful means. It openly denounced the use of force in the South
China Sea and contributed towards the easing of tensions between
the claimant states. The signatories of the 2002 Declaration also
pledged to undertake cooperative activities and increase the possibility of agreements being reached on joint oil exploration and development schemes. Furthermore, the declaration was perceived as
a sign that China was willing to respect the ASEAN principles and
co-exist peacefully with its Southeast Asian neighbors. This accommodative position was further illustrated when China became the
first non-ASEAN nation to sign the TAC in 2003.
Finally, the future of East Asian regionalism will continue to
depend on the strength of ASEAN. Southeast Asia has been undergoing political transformations and has faced a series of non-traditional security challenges. Such changes in regional dynamics have
raised a significant question for institution-building in the sub-region. Indonesia suggested at the thirty-sixth ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting (AMM), in Phnom Penh in June 2003, the establishment of
an ASEAN Security Community (ASC) - later renamed the
ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) in acknowledgment
of the region's political constraints - in Southeast Asia by 2020, following a Singaporean proposal to establish an ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC). 32 The ASC was later endorsed at the ASEAN
Summit in Bali in October 2003. On the back of its own attempts to
strengthen regionalism in its backyard, Southeast Asia has become
an incubator of sorts, nurturing a form of Asian regionalism that is
characterized by a whole myriad of regional institutions and the distinct slew of acronyms.
However, increasing doubts are being cast by skeptics who
view Asia's increasingly cluttered regional architecture as detrimental and ultimately, strategically incoherent. According to them, the
regional framework and its institutions have glaring inadequacies
and they are quick to flesh out the failures of these institutions at
moments where they should matter most. The reference point always goes back to the Asian Financial Crisis, where the weaknesses
of ASEAN and the existing institutional framework were evident.
Critics argue how the consequences of the crisis revealed how little
substance there was to the claims of harmony and cooperation in
32. The implementation of the ASEAN Community has since been brought forward from 2020 to 2015.
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ASEAN. While ASEAN expanded its membership and attempted
to export its managerial style - the "ASEAN Way" - and its loose,
consultative manner of building positive norms to the wider region,
the trajectory of regionalism in East Asia remains ambiguous and
disputes on the other hand remain largely unresolved.
The ARF for instance, has been mocked for decades as a mere
"talk-shop" and "deafeningly silent" on other occasions by its
harshest critics. Moreover, critics have also berated the ARF for its
complacency during the height of major security crises in the region, the latest being tensions in the Korean Peninsula with the
sinking of the Cheonan and the South China Sea dispute, which
emerged at the Hanoi ARF meeting in June 2010 as a major point
of contention involving not just the traditional claimants, but now
the US as well. Likewise, the APT has been taken to task as being a
"misguided and deluded" attempt at an "Asian solution for Asian
problems" in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis.3 3 Others have
pointed out that the nebulous and inchoate geographic notion of
"East Asia" would pose significant obstacles to any idea of a coherent East Asian regional form coming into being as the ambiguity of
who belongs or should belong will remain a problem for East Asian
Regionalism. Although membership can be negotiated, as Tow and
Taylor suggest, it then also has "clear implications for the comprehensiveness and cohesion of a regional or pan-regional architectural
vision."34 Hence, the tendency towards an open and inclusive approach to regionalism has resulted in the spillovers and overlaps in
membership among the various regional groupings. This raises the
question of how any regional architecture can be conceived to
broadly and convincingly address the diversity of Asia.

m.

THE EAST ASIA SUMMIT:

FORMATION AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
After APEC, the ARF and the APT, the East Asian Summit is
the latest institution to emerge on the regional landscape. The EAS
grew out of the proposal of then South Korean President Kim Dae
Jung, made at the second APT meeting in Vietnam in November
1998, for the formation of an East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) to
explore the prospects for the formation of an East Asian commu33. David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional Delusion (London: Edward Elgar, 2006), p. 148.
34. William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor, "What is Asian Security Architecture?,"
Review of InternationalStudies, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January 2010), pp. 95-116.

THE EAST ASIA SUMMIT

23

nity.3 1 Comprising 26 civilian experts, the group was tasked to research and recommend concrete measures that the APT could take
to increase East Asian regional cooperation. It was obvious that the
general consensus among all thirteen participants of the APT was a
keenness to develop East Asian regionalism in a more concrete
manner.
In 2001, the EAVG released the findings of its study in the
form of a report titled "Towards an East Asian Community: Region
of Peace, Prosperity, and Progress." 3 6 Among the items in the report was the recommendation for the establishment of an East Asia
Summit. Based on its observations of regional events and the developing regionalism, it envisioned East Asian nations moving towards
establishing a truly regional community. It argued that such a community would be of benefit to the states in the region, and this
could be achieved by building on the existing regional cooperatives
and deepening the processes of institutionalization. The East Asian
Summit, it recommended, would be a useful means to build community and pre-empt or resolve any future regional challenges that
may arise.
Initial reactions to the proposal were cautiously positive. While
states concerned broadly embraced the EAS idea as a further step
to community building in the region, opinions differed over the vehicle through which this was to be actualized. Some states, such as
China, remained inclined towards the APT, and believed the existing APT framework would provide the best means of bringing
the EAS to fruition, whereby the APT would become the EAS itself with the chair rotating among the members. Certainly, in the
case of Malaysia, initiatives such as the APT and EAS were seen as
extensions of former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's proposals, made fifteen years earlier and endorsed by the Chinese, for the
creation of an exclusive East Asian grouping. On its part, and in
response to initial indications that states like India, Australia, and
the United States would be omitted from the EAS, Japan expressed
its preference for inclusive regionalism." Concern for the erosion
of their centrality to the building of regional architectures however,
continued to define ASEAN's response, and explained their reluc35. Kim Dae Jung, "Regionalism in the Age of Asia," Global Asia, Vol. 1, No. 1
(2006), p. 11.
36. The document is available at www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-pacilreport200l.pdf.
37. See Toru Oga, "Open Regionalism and Regional Governance: A Revival of
Open Regionalism and Japan's Perspectives on the East Asia Summit," Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2009), pp. 181-182.
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tance to simply have the APT transformed into the EAS. Eventually, it was decided that the EAS would take the form of a separate
institution altogether, complete with its own summit meeting.
Following the proposals of the EAVG, then Malaysian Prime
Minister Abdullah Badawi proposed at the APT summit in 2004 to
materialize the recommendations for the EAS and offered to host
the first meeting in Kuala Lumpur the following year. In December
2005, the East Asia Summit - comprised of ASEAN, China, Japan,
South Korean, India, Australia, and New Zealand - met for the first
time alongside the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Kuala
Lumpur, with Russia also present as observer at the invitation of
the Malaysian hosts. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Chairman's Statement and Kuala Lumpur Declaration clarified that the
EAS was to be an "open" forum "for dialogue on broad strategic,
political and economic issues of common interest and concern with
the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in
East Asia."" Furthermore, the Chairman's Statement also affirmed
the role of ASEAN as the primary driver of the EAS, and that the
gathering would be a leader-led meeting "for strategic discussions
on key issues affecting the region and the evolving regional architecture." To give the meeting some substance, an East Asia Summit
Declaration on Avian Influenza Prevention, Control, and Response

was also signed, committing members to deepen cooperation on
policies to combat avian flu.
Originally scheduled for Cebu in December 2006, the second
EAS was postponed because of concerns for disruption as a result
of Typhoon Utor. The Summit eventually convened in January 2007
where further progress in trade and regional integration was made
with the announcement of deeper study into the possibility of a
CEPEA (Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia)
agreement to be conducted at a Track Two level, with support from
an Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia
(ERIA), whose creation was confirmed at the third EAS meeting in
Singapore in 2007.39
38. See "Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit," Kuala Lumpur,
December 14, 2005. Available at http://www.aseansec.org/18098.htm
39. Item 12 of the Chairman's Statement read: "We welcomed ASEAN's efforts
towards further integration and community building, and reaffirmed our resolve to
work closely together in narrowing development gaps in our region. We reiterated our
support for ASEAN's role as the driving force for economic integration in this region.
To deepen integration, we agreed to launch a Track Two study on a Comprehensive
Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) among EAS participants. We tasked the
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Together with the ASEAN Summit and APT, the fourth installment of the EAS to be hosted by Thailand was postponed and
rescheduled on several occasions because of the internal crisis in
Thai politics. The September 2006 military coup in Thailand precipitated widespread political protests as supporters and opponents of
deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra tussled for primacy in
Thai politics as street demonstrations became all too frequent. By
September 2008, the animosity between both factions turned decidedly hostile with the outbreak of violence, forcing the Thai government to declare a controversial state of emergency. The fourteenth
ASEAN Summit scheduled for December was subsequently postponed because of attendant security concerns. ASEAN leaders
eventually reconvened in the central resort towns of Hua Hin and
Cha-am between February 27 and March 2 in 2009. While the
ASEAN Summit proceeded without distraction, Thai authorities
took the decision to postpone the Association's meetings with dialogue partners yet again, rescheduling them for the resort of Pattaya on April 10-12, 2009. As ASEAN and regional leaders
gathered in Pattaya, the deepening of Thailand's political malaise
saw pro-Thaksin "red-shirt" supporters storm the Summit venue on
April 10, forcing the besieged government of Prime Minister
Abhisit Vejjajiva to suffer the ignominy of having to cancel the
meeting at the eleventh hour and evacuate visiting leaders from
ASEAN and its dialogue partners by helicopter to a nearby military
airbase. ASEAN, the APT, and the EAS eventually met in Hua
Hin and Cha-am in October 2009.
The sixteenth ASEAN Summit in Hanoi set the stage for the
fifth EAS by outlining the focus of the institution. Specifically, discussions focused on the objectives of connectivity and CEPEA. Of
further note at the summit was the explicit interest expressed by
ASEAN leaders to draw both the United States and Russia into the
EAS. To that end, the Chairman's Statement noted:
We recognized and supported the mutually reinforcing
roles of the ASEAN+3 [APT] process, the East Asia Summit (EAS), and such regional forums as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to promote the East Asian
cooperation and dialogue towards the building of a community in East Asia. In this connection, we encouraged
ASEAN Secretariat to prepare a time frame for the study and to invite all our countries
to nominate their respective participants in it." The Chairman's Statement of the Second EAS is available at http://www.aseansec.org/19302.htm
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Russia and the US to deepen their engagement in an
evolving regional architecture, including the possibility of
their involvement with the EAS through appropriate modalities, taking into account the Leaders-led, open and inclusive nature of the EAS.4 0
Aside from providing another venue for the United States to
demonstrate its commitment to the development of regionalism in
East Asia, overtures to Washington and Moscow to join the EAS
were also driven by the strategic move to generate countervailing
power against increasing Chinese assertiveness in regional affairs.4 1
Following this, senior ASEAN officials also decided to impose a
moratorium on EAS membership through the introduction of a period of "consolidation and reflection." 42
When the EAS was established by ASEAN in 2005, two issues
were critical for how they shaped the Association's thinking on the
role and underlying premises for the new institution. First, as in the
case of the ARF, the ASEAN members were keen to further institutionalize great power relations within a multilateral cooperative
structure. A core driver of Asia-Pacific regionalism has historically
been the institutionalization of ties between these powers through
and with the support of the ASEAN-led arrangements. The members of the Association have traditionally hoped to secure the commitment of the great powers to the promotion of regional peace
and security in Southeast Asia and beyond.
Second, when establishing the EAS, ASEAN was keen to preserve its driving role in East Asian regionalism. Advocates of multilateralism had continued to claim the relevance of ASEAN to East
Asia's stability and security, and see its cooperative initiatives as an
essential contribution to regional community formation. It should
be mentioned that ASEAN's assigned leading role in the EAS was
more by default than anything else since the prospect of either
China or Japan at the helm of the EAS would in all likelihood be
viewed as unacceptable, at least for the foreseeable future. This
readily put to rest, at least in the short to medium term, early concerns regarding which country or coalition of the willing other than
ASEAN could conceivably have emerged to take the reins of the
Summit. That said, with the leadership of the EAS resting primarily with ASEAN, a fait accompli of sorts had already been estab40. Available at http://www.aseansec.org/24509.htm
41. "US, Russia to join EAsia group," Straits Times, July 20, 2010.
42. Interview with a senior foreign ministry official, Singapore, September 13, 2010.
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lished. Indeed, the modality of the EAS was understood to be
similar to those of other ASEAN-led institutions and defined by
the norms and principles stipulated in the TAC. Unsurprisingly,
proponents of the Association argued that the ASEAN-led formula
had proven to be feasible in Asia, and hence should be applied to
the Summit. The Association's critics understandably offered more
circumspect and dismissive views.
Insofar as the scholarly community was concerned, the plan to
materialize the East Asia Summit was met with considerable skepticism. After all, the existing ASEAN-led institutions have drawn
considerable flak over the years for their arguable failure to achieve
stated aims or progress beyond the confidence building stage. The
inclusion of the EAS ignited the common criticism of the proliferating "alphabet-soup" of Asian groupings - a growing number of acronyms for a myriad of regional configurations with incoherent
overlaps leading to a murky, informal, ambiguous state of regional
affairs.
However, the EAS was envisioned as a form of response on
the part of ASEAN - a demonstration of its commitment to the
development and progress of regional architecture. Instead of adding to the "alphabet-soup" of groupings, the EAS was justified as
a process of streamlining the ASEAN+ (ASEAN plus) meetings.
For instance the APT meetings with China, South Korea, and Japan
as well as ASEAN+1 meetings with other dialogue partners such as
India, have been taking place alongside ASEAN summit meetings
leading to extremely packed schedules for government officials,
ministers and heads of state with series upon series of back-to-back
meetings. For greater institutional efficiency and to limit the potential overlaps, ASEAN members argued that incorporating the
ASEAN+ meetings into the EAS would be a prudent measure. By
pulling all of ASEAN's dialogue partners in the Asian and closer
Pacific region into the same forum for discussion and cooperation,
regionalism in Asia seemed to be heading in a positive direction more complementary to the preexisting structures as opposed to
detrimental. The Asian region, it seemed, finally had a formal forum that was region-centric and focused, with a mix of membership
that arguably better reflected the state of play in the region in terms
of indigenous stakeholders.
EAS Membership and ASEAN Leadership
Established barely half a decade ago, the EAS remains in relative infancy. Cooperation on trade and energy were the first steps

28

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

of regional cooperation within the Summit. The process of community building remains a distant one with no clear blueprint as yet on
the actions and steps to achieving an ultimate aim, which remains
equally ambiguous. The issue of membership however, continues to
be a contentious issue in the EAS. Critics are quick to point to the
rift between China and ASEAN since the beginning in the determination of core membership. For instance, on the eve of the East
Asian Summit in December 2005, China suggested that instead of
ASEAN, existing APT members should form the core of the EAS
and steer the development of East Asian regionalism. Premier
WEN Jiabao had argued that the East Asian Summit should only
be led by East Asian countries to prevent the focus of the grouping
from being diluted by states outside of East Asia.4 3
However, ASEAN members were determined to avoid the region becoming divided into American or Chinese spheres of influence and were against providing another plausible opportunity for
China to lead regional development. After all, there have been arguments that suggest ASEAN has been struggling to ensure that
the APT meetings do not lean too heavily under Chinese influence.
Likewise, Japan, India, as well as Australia were similarly opposed
to the Chinese proposal of a "two-tiered, exclusionary and discriminatory EAS Structure."" As a testament to their determination to
set the balance right in the EAS, the ASEAN members also declined Chinese Premier WEN Jiabao's offer to host the second EAS
meeting.
Insistent as always to ensure that ASEAN remain the center of
gravity of any regional development, ASEAN members chose a
broad-based, inclusive approach and expanded the membership of
the EAS to include India, Australia, and New Zealand - relevant
dialogue partners in close proximity to the region with engaged
trading relationships - making the Summit at present a sixteenmember unit. After all, ASEAN was responsible for the materialization of the concept proposed by the EAVG and this has allowed
them to claim control over membership criteria such that only the
ten governments of ASEAN have the ability to decide on admission to the EAS. All members of the Association have to unanimously agree to accept a request to join the EAS. ASEAN insists
and continues to host meetings within Southeast Asia alongside
43. Mohan Malik. "China and the East Asian Summit: More Discord Than Accord," Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Working Paper,(Honolulu, HI: APCSS,
2006), p. 4.
44. Ibid, p. 5.
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ASEAN's own summits. Interested parties also have to accede to

ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, be a formal "dialogue
partner" and have a positive record of substantial cooperative relations with the organization before they can be seek to gain membership at the Summit.4 5 Hence, the core management of the EAS
continues to be ASEAN's responsibility and the qualifying criteria
for membership at the table has also been sufficiently detailed. This
clear direction of the Summit allows ASEAN to maintain its centrality and prevents the institution from becoming overshadowed by
greater powers and fading into the background. The evolution of
regional architecture as expressed in the EAS thus continues to remain an essentially ASEAN driven process.
EAS Expansion: The U.S. Factor
The United States had in the 1990s been supportive of multilateral initiatives in the Asia-Pacific, as demonstrated by its active participation in APEC and the ARF. The United States was not,
however, invited to join the EAS when it was first established in
Kuala Lumpur in 2005. At the inaugural EAS summit, the latest
institution was pitched as a predominantly Asian-centric forum concerned with community building and East Asian issues. It was
viewed as an evolution of the APT into a more holistic East Asian
body.4 6 At the time of its formation, the Bush administration had
already repeatedly indicated its preference for flexibility and mobility over formal and institutionalized arrangements. As a result,
Washington had been perceived regionally as increasingly disinterested in East Asian cooperation. For example, a non-active U.S.
involvement in the ARF had been felt when then Secretary of
State, Condoleezza Rice, decided not to attend the ministerial
meeting in Vientiane in July 2005. Dr. Rice's participation the following year somewhat eased concerns over the possible diminishing
US commitment to existing institutionalized arrangements. Yet, she
failed again to attend the following ministerial meeting in July 2007.
Nevertheless, initial statements from the Obama administration suggested a renewed U.S. interest in East Asian regionalism
and an American willingness to move beyond the issues of terror45. Donald K. Emmerson, "Asian Regionalism and US Policy: The Case for Creative Adaptation," S. Rajaratnam School of InternationalStudies Working Paper Series,
No. 193 (Singapore: RSIS, 2010), p. 2.
46. Deepak Nair, "Regionalism in the Asia Pacific/East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism?" ContemporarySoutheast Asia, Vol. 31, No. 1 (April 2009), p. 112.
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ism and maritime security. 47 These statements were rapidly followed by the inauguration of an ASEAN-United States Summit
held on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in November 2009. The
inaugural summit was followed by a second successful gathering
twelve months later. The Obama administration also announced the
ratification of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation by presidential
decree in July 2009. This opened the door for the United States to
join the EAS. Indeed, as mentioned above, ratifying the treaty is
viewed as a pre-condition to a full membership in the summit.
The issue of regional architecture and the possible inclusion of
the United States and Russia to the EAS emerged as a dominant
topic of discussion among regional leaders at the 16th ASEAN
summit in Hanoi in April 2010. U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton made clear to her ASEAN counterparts America's willingness
to join the EAS and consequently several leaders took to Singapore's proposal of an ASEAN+8 formula. However, the consensus
within ASEAN was split between the expansion of the EAS on the
one hand, and the ASEAN+8 proposal on the other. At the
ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting held in Hanoi the following
month, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Laos expressed their
preference for an expansion of the EAS rather than the introduction of an ASEAN+8. 4 8 For the most part, their reservations
stemmed from concern that the creation of another grouping would
render the existing regional architecture even more unwieldy, and
that prescribing another additional platform to a framework
(ASEAN+) that is still nebulous would only make Asian regionalism less coherent. Furthermore, there was a concern that the
ASEAN+8 would overshadow the APT in a manner that would be
an added detriment considering the momentum and progress the
APT was enjoying. Whatever their concerns, the ASEAN foreign
ministers were nonetheless united in their belief that the inclusion
of these two major powers would enhance the value, weight and
influence of the ASEAN bloc.49 If anything, it reflected ASEAN's
perennial desire to engage outside powers peacefully within
47. "Hillary Clinton promises to attend ASEAN foreign minister, ARF meetings,"
China View, February 19, 2009. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-02/
19/content_10844924.htm
48. Graeme Dobell, "ASEAN's Divide on US," www.lowyinterpreter.org, August
16, 2010. Available at http://lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/08/16/Scoop-ASEANs-divide-on-US.aspx
49. Nirmal Ghosh, "Regional forum to include US, Russia," The Straits Times, July
21, 2010.

THE EAST

ASIA

SUMMIT

31

frameworks that were premised on ASEAN as the core organization in the development of Asian regional architecture.
Given the success of APT and the "ASEAN+" model overall,
Singapore envisaged in early 2010 an ASEAN+8 formula to accommodate the schedule of the new members in the event that their
respective leaders were not able to attend the Summit. The
ASEAN+ formula essentially allowed meetings to proceed without
necessarily full attendance. If accepted, the new ASEAN+8 would
have included all thirteen APT members as well as India, Australia,
New Zealand, Russia, and the United States. The proposal was to
convene a meeting every two years to coincide with the APEC
Leader's Meeting when it was hosted in the region. This was to
overcome the scheduling difficulties involved in bringing the American President to Asia and avoid any potential damage to the credibility of the EAS should the American leader not turn up. At the
time, this was believed to be the most pragmatic solution that would
not only allow ASEAN to engage the American and Russian heads
of state but at the same time avoid diluting the focus of the EAS.
For example, the EAS is currently working on a region-wide FTA
through the CEPEA process. Expanding the membership to Russia
and the United States was argued by some to be a possible complication for Asian-centric attempts at deepening regionalism such as
CEPEA.o
The surprising inclusion of the United States could be the result of seizing the opportune turn of events. The Bush administration's treatment of ASEAN had led to years of perceived American
disengagement with the regional body which subsequently allowed
China to play a larger, leading role at East Asian regional platforms. The absence of the administration's Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the ARF meetings on two occasions in 2005 and
2007 had further intensified the sense of disengagement felt on the
part of ASEAN. The Obama administration on the other hand appears to have reversed this policy. This was expressed most profoundly in the administration's decision to accede to ASEAN's
TAC, which paved the way for American membership in the EAS,
cemented American engagement with the region, and positioned
ASEAN-United States relations for an upturn. In addition, the participation of the United States in the EAS serves as a welcome bal-

50. K. Kesavapany, "ASEAN+8 - A Recipe for a New Regional Architecture," The
Straits Times, May 8, 2010.
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ance to the increasing domination and assertiveness of China not
just within the EAS, but more broadly in regional affairs as well.
Signs of a more active U.S. participation in East Asian regionalism have certainly been welcomed in ASEAN capitals, especially
if such participation comes hand in hand with an ongoing accommodative Chinese involvement in regional institutions. Indeed, an active U.S. participation combined with an accommodative Chinese
involvement arguably constitutes the best possible scenario for
ASEAN. That having been said, U.S. participation in the EAS
raises the important question of how the Summit can complement
existing cooperative arrangements and contribute to the emerging
security architecture in East Asia. Specifically, one can argue that
there is a risk that the EAS and APEC could end up competing
with one another and cancel each other out to the benefit of the
APT.
Successive U.S. administrations have approached APEC as the
core institutional cooperative expression in the Asia-Pacific in tune
with U.S. interests in the region. APEC was established in November 1989 as a regional economic dialogue. Its goal has been to encourage trade and investment liberalization. It is based on the
concepts of "inclusive regionalism" and "open regionalism," which
means that the outcome of accords on liberalization is applied without discrimination within the regional grouping but also to nonAPEC economies. This approach to regionalism particularly suits
U.S. interests in East Asia. Among others, APEC includes the
United States, Japan and China and, in contrast to the other arrangements, Taiwan. The first summit of the APEC heads of state
and government was organized in Seattle in November 1993 after
the scheduled session of finance ministers. The summit derived
from a proposal made by US President Bill Clinton at the meeting
of the Group of Seven (G7) in Tokyo in July 1993. Consequently,
APEC has developed into an institutional structure that combines
ministerial and heads of state and government meetings. By providing a framework for both multilateral and bilateral discussions, the
arrangement has assumed security significance beyond its focus on
economic issues. For instance, in response to the terror attacks in
the United States on September 11, 2001, the APEC summit in
Shanghai in October that year produced a declaration on terrorism,
even before the ARF or other arrangements had a chance to dis-
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cuss the issue."' At their next annual summit in Mexico two weeks
after the Bali bombings of October 12, 2002, the APEC leaders
adopted a series of anti-terror measures. APEC has also addressed
other security concerns. For example, the East Timor crisis was discussed at the APEC summit in Auckland in 1999 while the United
States, South Korea and Japan called on North Korea to dismantle
its nuclear weapons development program on the sidelines of the
Mexico summit meeting.
Hence, the EAS and APEC may share a similar dual agenda
consisting of trade and finance liberalization on the one hand and
traditional and non-traditional security issues on the other. In light
of scheduling difficulties, it is questionable whether the American
president will find the time to attend two summit meetings in Asia
every year, especially if their focus is remarkably similar. This is
precisely the reason why the ASEAN+8 initiative sought to preempt a possibly embarrassing situation where the American president would not attend the EAS every year by making it coincide
with the APEC Leader's Meeting when it was hosted in the region.
While the EAS and APEC risk cancelling each other out, one
should note the rapid institutionalization of the APT since its formation in 1997. The first grouping linking all of the Northeast and
Southeast Asian countries, with the exception of Taiwan, now consists of annual summits and fifty-five other bodies established (fourteen ministerial and nineteen senior official groups, two meetings of
Director-Generals, eighteen technical level meetings, and two
Track Two meetings).5 2 Therefore, to remain relevant, an EAS that
includes the United States should not be regarded as a replacement
for APEC, the ARF or the APT. On the contrary, the summit will
need to complement existing cooperative arrangements and contribute to the emerging security architecture defined by the trends
and driving forces discussed in the previous chapter.
Indeed, a major concern expressed by observers is the danger
that the EAS could become indistinguishable from the ARF or
APEC because of the complexion of the various memberships,
which overlap. Some have lamented how debates over the role of
the United States betrayed the lack of maturity of East Asian re51. APEC Leaders Statement on Counter-Terrorism, Shanghai, People's Republic
of China, October 21, 2001.
52. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Overview ASEAN Plus Three Relations," August 2009, ASEAN Secretariat. Available at http://www.aseansec.org/
16580.htm
53. Malik, "China and the East Asian Summit," p. 5.
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gionalism, claiming that as long as the cold war politics of power
balancing continues to maintain its hold on ASEAN states, any formation of a truly East Asian regional community with ASEAN involved will be difficult to materialize because of the perennial fear
of falling under excessive Chinese or American dominance. 5 4 Moreover, the expansion would seem to further dilute the political meaning of what "East Asia" actually is - something that the Summit
was trying and did seem successful in concretizing at some point.
The Chinese government has expressed disdain on several occasions at the reluctance of ASEAN to build a more definitive "East
Asian" multilateral forum by adopting an inclusive approach and
allowing pacific nations and other extra-regional great powers to be
involved in the region. However, China has refrained from demonstrating its displeasure with the broadening membership of the
EAS. In part, Chinese restraint can be attributed to the reluctance
to appear overbearing and offend ASEAN members who desire
American involvement. In addition to that, China is careful to avoid
confirming ASEAN fears of China's hegemonic intentions. This
would have been counterproductive to the "peaceful rise" campaign that the Chinese government has been working on.
The EAS: What is it for?
There is arguably a coherence that can be read in the developments of the EAS. When one compares the relative infancy of the
EAS to the APT, the former pales in comparison to the more matured APT platform which has not been streamlined into the Summit. Instead, it continues to meet and function alongside the
Summit, committed to the FTAs and trading agreements that have
been planned. Emmerson writes that the profile and activities of
the EAS cannot compare to the cooperation and blueprints of development that the APT has already established within its more defined membership." From this point of view, the expansion of the
EAS should not be simply read as a step backwards for East Asian
regionalism. The potential of the EAS to further advance regionalism was given greater currency by Soesastro, who argued that
before the creation of the EAS, none of the existing institutions had
the right mix of members to fulfill the basic functions that the regional architecture would need to address: to provide a collective
54. See Christopher Dent, East Asian Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2008);
Nair, "Regionalism in the Asia Pacific."
55. Emmerson, "Asian Regionalism and US Policy," p. 2.
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forum for regional leaders and relevant partners to address the critical regional and global issues that affect the region, to facilitate the
establishment of an environment, to strengthen and deal effectively
with economic integration, and to address political and security issues as well.
After all, while the initial idea was to streamline the various
"ASEAN+" meetings into the EAS, the fact remains that none of
the pre-existing meeting platforms were done away with. This appeared baffling - as if Asia did not have enough groupings, another
was going to be added to the fray with no effort to reshape or
streamline the regional architecture - and its was criticized as an
"oddity," neither a substitute for the APT nor a distinctively separate mechanism in its own right. The EAS by nomenclature lays
claim to the geographical boundary called "East Asia" whereas the
ASEAN+ framework is technically by definition a mere cooperative relationship established with a foreign partner outside of the
Southeast Asian boundary. By mere reasoning, the EAS would
have been the most suitable to lead the way for the development of
an East Asian Community. Yet, a review of the Kuala Lumpur declaration in 2005 would indicate that the EAS was not meant as the
pinnacle institution to drive community building. Instead, it was
pitched as one of the means to building community. The rest of the
existing frameworks were to work in tandem together with the EAS
in strengthening Asian regionalism. It seems that a large number of
the critics have been blindsided by the whole "East Asian Community" project and have imposed unwarranted expectations of the
EAS.
Instead, as the EAS has taken shape over the years, it should
be viewed more as a new grouping of eighteen members as opposed
to an "ASEAN+3+3" framework. Dialogue partners such as India
and Australia for example, have had scant opportunity to meet with
the APT members or with each other on such a platform to deal
with regional challenges or foster cooperation. Russia has been an
observer at the Summit and the new addition of the United States
in 2011 will bring all the major players who have deep interest (and
stakes, it should be added) in the affairs of Asia at the same table.
Hence, despite the problems with geographical definitions, in hindsight, it was fortuitous that the APT was not dissolved or subsumed
56. Hadi Soesastro, "Architectural Momentum in Asia and the Pacific," East Asia
Forum Quarterly, June 14, 2009. Available at http://www.iseas.edu.sg/aseanstudiescentre/ascdf3 soesastro 140609.pdf.
57. Dent, East Asian Regionalism, p. 169.
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under the Summit. No one could have predicted the increased enthusiasm from greater powers such as Russia and the United States
to be at the regional table, particularly given their lukewarm reactions in the earlier stages of the evolution of the EAS. Likewise, it
would also seem foolish to reject their interest for the sake of preserving the "Asian-ness" of the Summit. The malleability of the
EAS, paradoxically a consequence of its relative infancy, has allowed ASEAN to accommodate the interests of both great powers.
More inclusive than the APT and less expansive than the existing trans-Pacific platforms, the EAS functions as a suitable gobetween that fits coherently in ASEAN's aims for East Asian regionalism. Furthermore, the American and Russian agreement to
sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which is the essential
demonstration of commitment in ASEAN terms made the expansion of the EAS all the more appealing as opposed to creating a
new "ASEAN+" configuration that would have been a more informal platform (not to mention the questionable utility of participation as a

"+"

member for the United States). By expanding the

EAS, the Summit begins to take an inclusive, trans-pacific nature.
After all, the concerns since the beginning against Dr. Mahathir's
proposal for an East Asian Caucus have been to avoid building an
exclusionary, inward-looking regional organization.
The fact of the matter is that the dynamism of Asia will require
a trans-pacific strategy to mediate. At the same time of course, as
East Asian regionalism continues to develop, building a regional
architecture that will aid the formation of an East Asian Community - a major objective of the EAS - has been featured promi-

nently in the agenda of ASEAN. This is evident from the creation
of the APT process to the evolution of the EAS as a proposed
means of formalizing the APT configuration. While the expansion
of the EAS would seem counter-intuitive to the development of
East Asian regionalism, it should be noted that the building of any
regional community does not come from merely establishing a summit. Particularly for the East Asian region as it lies at the crossroads
of economic transactions and great power relations, building an exclusive multilateral platform is a harder, more challenging task.
Even then, it remains to be seen how the EAS can aid community
building. One should not forget that it is a compact, ASEAN-centric grouping that is "avowedly open, inclusive, transparent, and
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outward-looking."" It is also new enough to be flexible and molded
to suit today's changing needs as evidenced by the expansion to include the United States and Russia. The EAS thus, can be seen as
being further supported by the existing APT platform that although
lacking in the proper nomenclature, is still the quintessential regional cooperative that functions reasonably well and is exclusively
a Northeast and Southeast Asian grouping. When viewing how the
EAS and APT can potentially work in a complementary tandem,
building an East Asian community may not be as far away as detractors might think.
IV.

THE EAS AND ONGOING DEBATES ON EAST
ASIAN REGIONALISM

The politics surrounding the creation of the EAS speaks to several ongoing debates over the nature and model of East Asian regionalism. While this monograph does not intend to resolve any of
these debates, a rehearsal of the key points of contention would be
useful as it allows us to locate the EAS in broader trends of East
Asian regionalism, and to set the context for its future evolution
and development. To these ends, three debates are of particular
salience.
ASEAN Centrality: Is it Sustainable?

Regardless of heated debate among academics, the centrality
of ASEAN in Asia's institutional architecture has hitherto never
been seriously questioned. This is no longer the case, however. Officially, ASEAN remains in the "driving seat" of several existing regional arrangements which the regional association helped found,
notably, the ARF, APT, and the EAS. In May 2010, the ASEAN
Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus Eight (ADMM+8) defense track,
whose membership is comprised of the ten ASEAN countries, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, and
the United States was established, adding yet another "ASEAN+"
arrangement in the burgeoning ASEAN-based institutional complex. According to an analyst, the inaugural ADMM+8 meeting
constitutes "a historic meeting that will establish the basic modalities for a new regional security architecture designed to build confidence, practical cooperation among defense leaders and militaries,
58. Rajik Sikri, "Building an East Asian Community," East Asia Forum, April 1,
2010. Available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/04/01/building-an-east-asiancommunity
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and promote peace and prosperity in the dynamic Asia Pacific region."" In the view of Ron Huisken, a long-time observer of the
region, the ADMM+8, likely to take shape as "one of the most substantial pieces of Asia's multilateral security architecture," makes it
"an acronym to watch." 60
Yet, as recent institutional developments at both the global and
regional levels suggest, - in particular, arrangements such as the
G20 and the China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Summit - there is considerably less inhibition these days among non-ASEAN states to
undertake, apart from ASEAN, diplomatic and economic initiatives
with potentially significant ramifications for regional architecture
and cooperation in Asia.
Proposals on Asia's institutional architecture have been floated
from time to time. Where the recent spate of proposals appears to
differ fundamentally from their predecessors is their view of the
place and role of ASEAN in Asian regionalism. At least three have
stemmed from heads of government.
First, in May 2008, Kevin Rudd, the former prime minister and
current foreign minister of Australia, kicked off the process with his
idea of an "Asia-Pacific community." For the most part nebulous,
Rudd's vision consisted in an overarching institutional architecture,
an umbrella organization that would serve as a "one-stop shop" for
all things Asia, as it were. Furthermore, the community was to be
based on a concert of regional great and middle powers - including
Indonesia - with no visible role for ASEAN.6 1 Other than the expected chorus of protests from ASEAN leaders, the Rudd proposal
evoked ambivalent reactions from China and the United States. For
example, China's Assistant Foreign Minister, HU Zhengyue, announced that the conditions were not "ripe" for the Rudd's envisioned mechanism to be placed on the regional agenda just yet.6 2
And while Kurt Campbell, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for
59. Ernest Z. Bower, "Inaugural ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting + 8 in Hanoi:
The 1,000-Year-Old City Hosts Warriors Bent on Peace," Critical Questions (CSIS
Washington), October 10, 2010. Available at http://csis.org/publication/inaugural-aseandefense-ministers%E2%80%99-meeting-8-hanoi
60. Ron Huisken, "ADMM+8: An acronym to watch," East Asia Forum, October 8,
2010. Available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/10/08/admm8-an-acronym-towatch/
61. See Seng Tan, "The "Asia-Pacific Community" Idea: What Next?" RSIS Commentaries, No. 49, May 25, 2009. Available at http:/www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0492009.pdf
62. "What is Australia's Asia-Pacific idea all about?" Reuters, October 24, 2009.
Available at www.reuters.com/article/idUSSP389695
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Asia and the Pacific, did not - as misreported by an Australian
daily6 3 - oppose Rudd's vision, neither did he offer the outright
endorsement Canberra had likely hoped for.
Second, in March 2009, President LEE Myung-bak of South
Korea presented his "New Asia Initiative," which also envisaged
key responsibilities for regional powers in Asian regionalism and a
presumably global role for his own country.6 4 Third, not to be outdone, former Japanese premier Yukio Hatoyama, during a visit to
Beijing in September 2009, called for a European Union-like community for East Asia, one centered on a Sino-Japanese core that
presupposed a potential reconciliation and condominium between
the two Asian powers, not unlike European regionalism's reliance
on the Franco-German base.6 5 Principally focused on Northeast
Asia rather than ASEAN, the Hatoyama vision included the
United States but not Australia. Much like the Australian proposal,
the Japanese proposal received a cool response from Beijing and
ASEAN. 6 6
There is a fourth proposal, one considerably more substantial
than the preceding three. A report drafted by a PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council) regional task force on regional institutional architecture called for the establishment of an Asia-Pacific
Summit comprising the nineteen APEC participant states and India
for high-level discussions on key issues. The report also urged the
creation of an informal "G10," a caucus consisting of the Asia-Pacific members of the G20, which could ostensibly voice the collective concerns of all Asia-Pacific countries. 67 Noting that both the
ARF and APT have suffered from their 'southeast Asia-centric
leadership," the report conceded that ASEAN's position in the
"driving seat" of Asian regionalism is by default alone, given that it
is the only option politically acceptable to all regional stakehold63. Brad Norington, "Barack Obama's man Kurt Campbell junks Kevin Rudd's
Asia-Pacific plan," The Australian, June 12, 2009.
64. Cheong Wa Dae, "President announces "New Asia Initiative"," Korea.net,
March 8, 2009. Available at http://www.korea.net/news/News/NewsView.asp?serialno=
20090308001&part=101&SearchDay=
65. "Japan's new premier pitches East Asia union," China Daily, September 29,
2009. Available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-09/23/content_8724372.htm
66. Aurelia George-Mulgan, "Hatoyama's East Asia Community and regional leadership rivalries," East Asia Forum, October 13, 2009. Available at http://www.eastasia
forum.org/2009/10/13/hatoyamas-east-asia-community/
67. Hadi Soesastro, Allan Gyngell, Charles E. Morrison, and Mr Jusuf Wanandi,
"Report of Regional Task Force on Regional Institutional Architecture," prepared for
the PECC Standing Committee, June 2009, unpublished.
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ers. 68 At the time of writing, the report remains unpublished, which
implies possible disagreements could have arisen among PECC
member countries about the report's conclusions.
Without exception, the four visions discussed above signal a
growing disenchantment, within and without the region, over East
Asia's regional architecture - its extant structures, conventions, modalities, and leadership. These visions share at least four
commonalities.
First, in a reflection of academic debates alluded to earlier,
they share an evident concern for the lack of overarching coherence
in East Asia's regional architecture. This concern is by no means

new, not least for those who worry that Asia's cluttered institutional landscape - its "variable geometry," so-called - reflects the

absence of any broad strategic vision and rationale among the architects of East Asia's regionalism. Critics readily insist that the
fault lies with ASEAN, which, so the conventional wisdom goes,
went on an institution-building spree that privileged form over
function and content.6 9 The consequence, as such, was a messy, incrementally enhanced, and heavily compartmentalized architecture
comprising institutions formed on an ad hoc basis to meet quite

specific aims - APEC for trade liberalization, the ARF for confidence-building, the APT for economic and financial cooperation.
Yet non-ASEAN states must bear a measure of responsibility as
well. For example, little is made today of China's initial enthusiasm
for the EAS in the light of its current coolness towards the
Summit. 70
Second, while they accept that Asia's existing regional organizations - most of them, at least - are here to stay, they also call for

practical reform of those arrangements in line with the concern for
overall architectural coherence.' Proposed reforms include, inter
alia, clarifying and streamlining institutional roles and responsibilities. Yet here too there is a fundamental disagreement. Hinted at in
68. Ibid., p. 16.
69. See Seng Tan, ed., Do Institutions Matter? Regional Institutionsand Regionalism
in East Asia, RSIS Monograph No. 13 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2008).
70. Alan D. Romberg, "The East Asia Summit: Much Ado About Nothing - So
Far," Freeman Report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (December
2005). Available at http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=264
71. This concern also recalls the longstanding debate over the relevance and efficacy of existing institutions, whether their respective mandates and agendas are congruent or competitive, and so forth. See, Tan, "Introduction," in Tan, Regionalism in Asia,
Vol. III: Regional Order and Architecture in Asia, pp. 2-4.
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the Hatoyama proposal but most forcefully asserted in the Rudd
and PECC task force proposals is the perceived need for a major
architectural alteration to overcome the compartmentalization of
existing regional arrangements. 72 This is usually expressed in terms
of an overarching structure at the heads of government level - be it
Rudd's Asia-Pacific community or the PECC task force's Asia-Pacific Summit idea - armed with a comprehensive, region-wide
agenda. On the other hand, others insist that compartmentalization
in itself is not a problem, but concede that existing institutions have
suffered from rapid enlargements in membership and agenda and
as such have not been as effective as initially hoped. They thereby
argue for reclaiming the APEC mandate as an economic forum focused primarily on trade liberalization and investment - and, by
implication, keeping security issues within the ARF - and strengthening those institutions as problem-solving or "action-oriented"
mechanisms rather than just talk-shops. Significantly, it is the leaders of ASEAN countries, as much as anyone else, who are making
such observations today.
Third, they assume that no regional architecture is possible
without first establishing regional order. Crucially, the proposals
share the view that order can only be underwritten by a concert or
coalition of regional great and middle powers, although they differ
slightly on which power is to be included. Japan's proposal on the
East Asia Community stood out for its explicit acknowledgement
for Sino-Japanese rapprochement and collaboration as the anchor
for the regional union, not unlike the Franco-German anchor for
Europe. But whether the Asian powers in question are ready to
form their own version of the Elysde Treaty, which effectively
sealed reconciliation between the two European powerhouses and
provided the framework for bilateral cooperation, is unlikely, so
long as Japan resists issuing a comprehensive apology and related
restitutions demanded by its Asian neighbors. As two analysts have
noted elsewhere, "the future of the region depends on the rise of
China and the revitalization of Japan; one cannot happen without
the other. In other words, the future now depends on China and

72. Carlyle A. Thayer, "Kevin Rudd's multilayered Asia Pacific Community initiative," East Asia Forum, June 22, 2009. Available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/
06/22/kevin-rudds-multi-layered-asia-pacific-community-initiative/
73. See Seng Tan, "ARF: Ad hoc Regional Forum?" The Straits Times, July 30,
2010.
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Japan thinking together." 74 Understandably, the respective progenitors of the four architectural visions see key roles and responsibilities for their own countries, whether in those power coalitions or as
the (in their view) logical representative and mouthpiece for Asian
or Asia-Pacific interests to the wider world.
Fourth and most crucially for our purposes, they relax the extant assumption of ASEAN centrality in regionalism in East Asia.
Importantly, none dispute the Association's significant contribution
to Asia's regional architecture. Indeed, ASEAN's success laid in its
ability, as a grouping of mostly small (other than perhaps Indonesia) and weak states, to institutionalize and regularize security relations among northeast, southeast and south Asia and the world's
great powers - China, Japan, Russia, the United States - beginning

with the ARF in 1994. But even as ASEAN's subsequent struggles
with internal disunity and impotence raised doubts about its leadership of Asian regionalism and relevance to regional security, the
consensus on ASEAN's centrality held, for the most part, among its
regional partners. While this obviously did not stop other regional
states from starting their own multilateral initiatives, the courtesy of
consulting with ASEAN was more or less observed. Of late, however, there have been worrying signs that the centrality consensus
can no longer be taken for granted, such as in the case of recent key
decisions taken by the "+3" countries, China, Japan and Korea, at
the Trilateral Summit. And if the proposals considered above are
any indication, the willingness to rethink a long-held nonnegotiable
- ASEAN as the core of Asia's institutional architecture and regional cooperation - has grown considerably.
ASEAN is clearly concerned about such doubts regarding its
role in and relevance to the regional architecture. In the Association's report on its forty-third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Hanoi in July 2010, much was made about ASEAN's dialogue partner
countries reaffirming "their unequivocal support for ASEAN Centrality," as well as their declared hope that "ASEAN would continue to play a central role in the emerging regional architecture."
That it was necessary for such public expressions of support on behalf of ASEAN only serves to highlight the likely angst felt by the
Association at the incessant stream of questions over its ability to
"drive" Asian regionalism. At the same time, it is unlikely that the
74. Shiping Tang and Haruko Satoh, "Can China and Japan Think Together?"
PACNET No. 52, December 29, 2007.
75. "ASEAN Centrality on Centre-Stage, Ha Noi, July 23, 2010," in ASEAN Bulletin, July 2010. Available at http://www.aseansec.org/24842.htm
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criticism of ASEAN centrality will abate any time soon, so long as
the state of Asia's regional architecture remains as it is.
It should be noted too, that debates over ASEAN centrality
are not only taking place outside of the Association. While all
ASEAN states undoubtedly continue to press for ASEAN centrality, within the Association there have been rumblings of discontent
as a result of differences between those who see ASEAN centrality
as a means to the end of greater regional stability and integration
on the one hand, and others who appear increasingly interested in
ASEAN centrality as an end in itself on the other, and in so doing
could frustrate the kind of malleability that is proving critical in the
building of regional architecture on an immensely fluid geo-strategic terrain.
Inclusive versus Exclusive Regionalism
Another continuing problem for regionalism in East Asia has
been the issue of whether Asia's institutions ought to be regioncentric. This concern goes as far back as former Malaysian premier
Mahathir Mohamad's proposal for the East Asian Economic
Grouping (EAEG), later changed to the East Asian Economic
Caucus (EAEC), which, as noted earlier, some have regarded as
the precursors to both the APT and EAS.7 6 Memorably, the former
Malaysian leader sought to keep Australia and the United States
out of Asian regionalism." On its part, China has sought indirectly
to limit the role and influence of the United States in regionalism.
From a reluctant participant in the ARF, which it initially perceived
as a tool for a Washington-led encirclement, China today has
evolved into a clever connoisseur of multilateralism in the service of
its own interests. The APT and ASEAN-China bilateral ties are
good illustrations of Beijing's growing influence in Asia as facilitated by regionalism.
At the same time, Beijing's initial enthusiasm for the EAS fizzled when it became clear that others wanted the Summit broadened to include Australia, India, and New Zealand presumably to
widen the area of economic integration, but also to countervail
76. Masahiro Kawai, "Evolving Economic Architecture in East Asia," ADB Institute Discussion Paper, No. 84 (Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute, December
2007), p. 18.
77. Gregore Lopez, "Mahathir's Regional Legacy," East Asia Forum, June 17, 2010.
Available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/06/17/mahathirs-regional-legacy/
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against perceived Chinese dominance of the APT." Subsequent
talk of possible interest on the part of the United States in joining
the EAS, especially following Washington's accession to the Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation in July 2009, likely cooled Beijing's commitment to the EAS even further. In this respect, while China has
not openly sought to exclude United States' participation in East
Asian regionalism, it continues to treat very seriously what David
Shambaugh calls the "balance of influence" in Asia, 7 9 and has
worked assiduously to enhance its image and influence over Asian
countries relative to that of America. For example, Beijing's hosting
of the first ever summit of the Mekong River Basin countries (including Myanmar) in April 2010 has been seen by some as a public
diplomacy effort to balance out the goodwill earned by Washington
from its accession to the TAC.80
On the other hand, a key feature of Asia's institutional landscape is its open and inclusive character. As Prime Minister Lee
Hsien Loong of Singapore remarked in his keynote address at the
2006 edition of the Shangri-La Dialogue concerning the regional
institutional architecture, "the most robust and stable configuration
for regional cooperation is an open and inclusive one."81 Analysts
have also taken note of both the economic and security versions of
"open regionalism" that ostensibly define Asia's brand of regionalism.82 It bears reminding that ASEAN's early years following Confrontation (Indonesia's undeclared war in opposition to the
78. Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja, ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6: Which
Way Forward? ADB Institute Discussion Paper, No. 77 (Tokyo: Asian Development
Bank Institute, 2007); Frank Frost and Ann Rann, "The East Asia Summit, Cebu, 2007:
issues and prospects," E-Brief, 1 December 2006, updated December 20, 2006 (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2006). Available at
www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/FAD/eastasia-summit2007.htm
79. David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," InternationalSecurity, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 64-99.
80. This observation was made by prominent Thai journalist, Kavi Chongkittavorn.
Cited in Marwaan Macan-Markar, "China, US angle for Mekong influence," Asia
Times Online, June 15, 2010. Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Chinal
LF15Ad01.html
81. Keynote Address by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the 5th International
Institute for Strategic Studies" (IISS) Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue),
June 2, 2006, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore. Available at http://www.iiss.org/conferences/
the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-archiveshangri-la-dialogue-2006/2006-plenary-session-speeches/keynote-remarks-he-lee-hsien-loong/
82. On open economic regionalism, see Garnaut, Open Regionalism and Trade Liberalization:An Asia-Pacific Contribution to the World Trade System. On open security
regionalism, see Acharya, "Ideas, Identity, and Institution building: From the 'ASEAN
Way' to the 'Asia-Pacific Way'."
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formation of the Federation of Malaysia, lasting from 1963 to 1966)
and during the Vietnam War were marked by concern over potential interference in Southeast Asia by extra-regional powers. The
concern found rhetorical expression in the Zone of Peace, Freedom
and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) idea in the 1970s, but was never realized. Indeed, the regional aspiration for neutrality did not prevent
ASEAN states from remaining defense allies of the United States
(Philippines and Thailand) and as members of the Five Power Defense Arrangement (Malaysia and Singapore). But more than these,
the developments that perhaps best embody ASEAN's proactive
engagement of external interactions is its "ASEAN+1" dialogue
partner and Fost-Ministerial Conference (PMC) structures, which
laid the groundwork for wider regional arrangements such as
APEC and the ARF. If anything, the rocky road from ZOPFAN to
the ARF highlights the gradual acceptance by the ASEAN states,
particularly Indonesia, of the need to proactively engage the big
powers rather than eschew them.
Open regionalism suggests that regionalism in East Asia is by
no means a purely indigenous and hermetically contained enterprise. It also means that different models of regionalism could be
accommodated - uneasily at times though - within open regional-

ism's flexible parameters. Regional ambivalence has permitted
traditionally "non-Asian" states to participate in various "Asian"
regionalisms. As Julia Gibson has noted, "The changing shape of
East Asian institutions and debates over the very meaning of the
region provide ample space for their legitimate inclusion."8 4 The
seemingly offhand way with which ASEAN sometimes treats questions regarding institutional architecture and membership composition could be attributed to the lack of a collective ASEAN position
and policy on these issues. But at the same time, it also suggests that
ASEAN's ultimate concern is in ensuring its centrality in those institutions: "The core concern of the ten Southeast Asian members
of ASEAN is not so much the scope of membership of regional
institutions as in ensuring the centrality of Southeast Asia's position
83. Joseph Camilleri, "East Asia's Emerging Regionalism: Tensions and Potential in
Design and Architecture," Global Change, Peace and Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2005), pp.
253-261; James R. Kurth, "The Pacific Basin versus the Atlantic Alliance: Two Paradigms of International Relations," Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, Vol. 505 (September 1989), pp. 34-45.
84. Julia Gibson, "Regionalism and security in East Asia," in Anthony Burke and
Matt McDonald, eds., CriticalSecurity in the Asia-Pacific (Manchester and New York:
Manchester University Press, 2007), p. 39.
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within them. The approaches of individual Southeast Asian countries differ but they all want to secure a role for ASEAN in any
regional architecture."" At the very least, Asian regionalism has
not been confined to geography for political as well as functional
reasons. The relative inconsequentiality of geography in some regional arrangements only underscores the issue-specific or functionalist rationale that underpins them.
Process versus Outcomes
The foregoing discussion takes us to another important consideration alluded to earlier: so far as ASEAN is concerned, is its "default centrality" in Asian regionalism a means to an end, or purely
an end in itself? This question is at the heart of the debate over
whether East Asian regionalism is oriented towards process or results. In the immediate post-Cold War period, with its standing as
primus inter pares (first among equals) in the Asia-Pacific more or
less assured, ASEAN was celebrated as regional organization par
excellence owing to a most unusual development in the annals of
international relations: a Third World regional organization defining the terms of regional security in a region of acute interest for
big powers.87 With its leading role in the creation of the ARF, a
multilateral security forum servicing the entire Asia-Pacific region,
ASEAN became not only the hub of a regional initiative involving
the world's major powers (China, Japan, Russia, and the United
States), but it in effect shaped the form and content of Asian
regionalism.
As a result, much has been made of the ASEAN Way, the
model of regional security to which ASEAN bestowed the ARF.
With confidence-building very much at the core of the ARF's activities, it was argued that the ASEAN Way - which emphasizes consultation, flexible consensus, informality, institutional minimalism,
cooperative security, and noninterference - so crucial to ASEAN's
85. Soesastro et al, "Report of Regional Task Force on Regional Institutional Architecture," p. 13.
86. Nonetheless, functionally-oriented institutions could impede regionalism because they do not hold strictly to a geographically-bounded conception of region and
specifications. Andrew Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective," in Louise
Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds., Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and Regional Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 37-73.
87. This "structural anomaly" is discussed in Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum:
Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security, and Yuen Foong Khong, "Review Article: Making Bricks without Straw in the Asia-Pacific?" The Pacific Review, Vol. 10,
No. 2 (1997), pp. 289-300.
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own success story, was the appropriate model for Asia-Pacific security cooperation if not community building." And while newer
regional institutions such as the APT and EAS do not claim (not
publicly at least) the ASEAN Way as their diplomatic model, their
status as ASEAN-centric arrangements effectively ensures that
ASEAN's way of doing business - no different really than how the
world of sovereign states conducts its affairs, according to a former
secretary-general of ASEAN8 9 - is equally the modus operandi of
regionalism in Asia in general. Even then, analysts generally supportive of the ASEAN Way have also argued for the need for the
model to evolve to satisfy the demands of an increasingly transnational Asia, where the logics of state sovereignty and noninterference are no longer universally applicable. 90
Others argue that neither the ASEAN Way nor ASEAN centrality deserve the valorizations accorded them by ASEAN's backers. Critics contend that no matter the extent of regional aspiration
expressed in the seminal documents and evolutionary plans of action common in Asian regionalisms, concrete institutional progress
is not what those regionalisms are designed to achieve because
ASEAN-led regional initiatives are all about maintaining ASEAN's
pride of place and little else - a conflation of means and end.91
Rather, the ASEAN Way is seen by its detractors as a key reason
behind the yawning gap between upbeat institutional visions and
harsh regional realities. Hence the contention that East Asian regionalism is all process, since - so the reasoning goes - few to no

concrete results can come about, so long as the tacit aim of the
ASEAN Way is essentially to preserve not revise the regional status
88. Acharya, "Ideas, Identity, and Institution building: From the 'ASEAN Way' to
the 'Asia-Pacific Way'." In fact, the ASEAN Way was already being feted as early as
1989; see, Michael Haas, The Asian Way to Peace: A Story of Regional Cooperation
(New York: Praeger, 1989).
89. Against the notion that sovereignty, non-interference and the like are specific to
the ASEAN Way, Rodolfo Severino writes, "It must be noted at the outset that the socalled "ASEAN Way" is actually the way of the world, the world being, like ASEAN,
made up of sovereign states that are not subject to any extra-national authority." Rodolfo Severino, "Regional Institutions in Southeast Asia: The First Movers and Their
Challenges," Background Paper 24, Asian Development Bank (ADB) Study Finalization Workshop on Institutions for Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific, Shanghai, December 2-3, 2009.
90. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the
ASEAN Way (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005).
91. David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress:
ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order," InternationalSecurity, Vol. 32,
No. 1 (Summer 2007), pp. 148-184.
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quo. Or, as the late Michael Leifer once put it, ASEAN - and, by
extension, its complex of region-wide institutions - is all about conservation, not innovation.9 2
A related criticism to the "East Asian regionalism is all process" claim is that institutional efficacy in the service of regional
cooperation and integration ends up being sacrificed. There are five
limitations that result in regionalism in East Asia to be characterized by institutional minimalism. First, the region's institutions operate under few explicit procedural rules, delegate few tasks to
standing secretariats - indeed, most institutions have no secretariats; the ASEAN Secretariat provides administrative support for the
ARF, APT, and EAS, not to mention its parent organization,
ASEAN - and specify few obligations for their members. Second,
despite a growing web of overlapping institutions, regionalism in
Asia is still predominantly intergovernmental in nature rather than
supranational where sovereignties are pooled, or where authority is
delegated to nongovernmental bodies. Third, as the early confusion
over whether the APT or EAS is the appropriate regional vehicle
for building the East Asian Community clearly showed, Asia's
overlapping institutions are potentially competitive with rather than
complementary to one another. 93 Fourth, reliance on a consensusbased decision making system - flexible rather than unanimous and emphasis on preserving the "comfort level" of all participants,
when combined especially with sizeable memberships, complicate
attempts to reach agreements on effective cooperation. 9 4 In the
same vein, Richard Woolcott, the Australian special envoy tasked
to promote Rudd's Asia-Pacific community vision, has claimed regarding the ARF: "many believe it is too large and has made insufficient progress since its inception." 95 Finally, Asia's institutions are
primarily confidence-building exercises that aim at most to create
an environment conducive to incremental integration.
Given these "limitations," critics argue that the region's arrangements are not designed for efficiency, concrete action, and
92. Michael Leifer, ASEAN's Search for Regional Order (Singapore: Faculty of
Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore, 1987), p. 21.
93. Tan, Do Institutions Matter?
94. According to Mansur Olson's seminal work on group size and collective action,
the larger the group ceteris paribus the less likely its members will choose to cooperate
for some joint gain. Mansur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and
the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).
95. Richard Woolcott, "Towards an Asia Pacific Community," The Asialink Essays,
No. 9 (November 2009), p. 3.
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progress commensurate with their self-professed ambitions.9 6 For
the most part, they are not persuaded by ASEAN's establishment
of a charter in November 2007, concerned that this apparent shift to
a rules-based regionalism would only entrench Southeast Asia's intergovernmental character further as a consequence of codifying
ASEAN's longstanding sovereignty and non-interference norms.
As noted earlier, the chorus of appeals to streamline the extant regional institutional architecture stems from the concern for more
effective institutions. "The Asia Pacific region has too many organizations, yet they still cannot do all the things we require of them,"
as a prominent analyst has noted. "Instead of focusing on what
we've got, we should look at what we need."9 8 More recently, some
have sought to reconcile the tension between process and outcome.
Mostly unapologetic about regionalism in Asia, they note that a
process-based regionalism constitutes a central feature of regional
security management by a grouping of small states with particular
security calculations and domestic power configurations.99
V.

CONCLUSION: WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE EAS?

What might we expect of the EAS, particularly as it is still in its
infancy? The EAS should at best be regarded as another confidence-building exercise, at least in the short to medium term, especially because of its possible expansion to include the United States
and Russia. Critics see little institutional change deriving from the
EAS due to its inability to meet regularly and failure to agree on a
road map and a set of collaborative issues. They may add that the
only point of convergence among its sixteen participants - eighteen,
once the Americans and Russians are formally included - might
96. On institutional design and efficacy, see Amitav Acharya and Alastair lain
Johnston, "Comparing Regional Institutions: An Introduction," in Amitav Acharya and
Alastair lain Johnston, eds., Crafting Cooperation:Regional InternationalInstitutions in
ComparativePerspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 1-31; Etel
Solingen, "The Genesis, Design and Effects of Regional Institutions: Lessons from East
Asia and the Middle East," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 2 (June 2008),
pp. 261-294.
97. Eugene K. B. Tan, "The ASEAN Charter as 'Legs to Go Places': Ideational
Norms and Pragmatic Legalism in Community Building in Southeast Asia," SYBIL
(Singapore Year Book of International Law), Vol. 12 (2008), pp. 171-198.
98. Gyngell, "Design Faults: The Asia Pacific's Regional Architecture."
99. See, Ba, (Re)NegotiatingEast and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations; Deepak Nair, "Do Stated Goals Matter? Regional Institutions in East Asia and the Dynamic of Unstated Goals," RSIS Working
Paper,No. 199 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, June 2010).
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well be their willingness to let ASEAN assume the leadership of
this latest institutional form. It can be argued, however, that the
relevance of the EAS to Asia's stability will depend on two crucial
factors.
First, the EAS should neither be regarded as a replacement for
the ARF or the APT nor as an embryonic structure eventually constituting an alternative security architecture for East Asia. To be
sure, there remains a low possibility that the EAS could inadvertently sideline the ARF, if only because the EAS is a leader-driven
forum whereas the ARF is only a foreign ministers' conclave. But
given that ASEAN serves as the hub for both arrangements, it is
unlikely the Association would permit the ARF to lapse into irrelevance (although some might argue that has already taken place).
On the contrary, the EAS ought to complement existing cooperative arrangements and contribute to the emerging security architecture defined by the trends and driving forces discussed above.
However, much would be required not just of ASEAN but all regional participants to ensure that the agendas, interests and roles of
the EAS and its institutional counterparts in East Asia are neither
at odds nor duplicate one another's.
Second, the EAS should be viewed not only as a confidencebuilding enterprise - a central feature of all forms of Asia-Pacific
institutionalism - but also as a future venue for substantive cooperation. In other words, the EAS will need to graduate from a nascent
institution for addressing broad concerns and generalized confidence-building, to a regional mechanism armed with a thematic and
problem-oriented agenda. This is a major challenge for not only the
EAS, but all East Asian regionalisms. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the ARF is seeking to move beyond dialogue to practical
security cooperation in the area of transnational and/or nontraditional security concerns.1 00 Likewise, the latest regionalism to be
added to the mix, the ADMM+8, is aimed at facilitating and enhancing regional defense cooperation between and among the militaries of its member countries in humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief efforts, maritime security, and the like. While these
illustrations hint at an emerging regional consensus on the need to
move beyond talking and confidence-building, it remains to be seen
whether these institutions will realize these new expectations, or (as
100. See, Jirgen Haacke, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: From Dialogue to Practical Security Cooperation?" Cambridge Review of InternationalAffairs, Vol. 22, No. 3
(2009), pp. 427-49, and Rodolfo Severino, The ASEAN Regional Forum (Singapore:
ISEAS, 2009)
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their critics would insist) go the way of regionalism at large in emphasizing process over results. Similar questions confront the
EAS, particularly where the medium to long term is concerned.
That being said, it is imperative, at this early stage of the game,
that members of the EAS establish a level of comfort amongst
themselves. While the ASEAN countries have had four decades of
collective experience in regional reconciliation, such opportunities
have not been extended to the Northeast Asian members of the
EAS, whose relations with each other have largely been confined to
bilateral ties and the Six Party Talks. Likewise, countries such as
Australia, India and New Zealand also require time to establish
confidence with their counterparts from East Asia. Needless to say,
institutions with no other aim in sight other than confidence-building do not go far. It is therefore imperative that the EAS move
forward in due course to substantive collaboration on the complex
issues and challenges that affect the region. The EAS will therefore
at some stage have to redefine itself in functional and issue-specific
terms. Issues of interest and great urgency would include terrorism,
maritime security, energy challenges and climate change, as well as
health security. Importantly, such initiatives should be undertaken
in greater complementation with the ARF in an effort toward more
effective regional security cooperation.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACD
ADMM+8
AEC
AFC
AMF
AMM
APEC
APSC
APT
ARF
ASA
ASC
ASEAN
ASEM
CAP
CBM
CEPEA
CMI
CMIM
EAS
EAEC
EAEG
EAVG
ERIA
EU
FIA
G7
G20
GATT
IAP
IMF
NAFTA
NATO
PECC
PMC
SEATO
TAC
TSD
ZOPFAN

Asian Cooperation Dialogue
ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus Eight
ASEAN Economic Community
1997/1998 Asian Financial Crisis
Asian Monetary Fund
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN Political-Security Community
ASEAN Plus Three
ASEAN Regional Forum
Association of Southeast Asia
ASEAN Security Community
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Asia-Europe Meeting
Collective Action Plan
Confidence-building measure
Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia
Chiang Mai Initiative
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization
East Asia Summit
East Asian Economic Caucus
East Asian Economic Grouping
East Asian Vision Group
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East
Asia
European Union
Free Trade Agreement
Group of Seven
Group of Twenty
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Individual Action Plan
International Monetary Fund
North American Free Trade Area
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
Post-Ministerial Conference
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
Trilateral Security Dialogue
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

